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INTRODUCTION 
Much of the empirical research on the effectiveness of Web banner advertising may be divided into two broad 
categories—a concern with communication outcomes and a concern with cost effectiveness. In the former group 
belong studies of the effects of exposure to Web banners on an audience’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
responses. Dependent variables in these studies include brand recall and recognition (Briggs and Hollis 1997; Li and 
Bukovac 1999; Dreze and Hussherr 2003), attitude toward the brand (Dahlen, Rasch, and Rosengren 2003), click-
through rate (Gatarski 2001; Robinson, Wysocka, and Hand 2007), and purchase intention (Dahlen, Ekborn, and 
Morner 2000; Gong and Maddox 2003). Independent variables typically include characteristics of the banner ad 
itself, e.g., the type of appeal (Xie, Donthu, and Lohtia 2004); the information content of the ad copy (Calisir and 
Karaali 2008), particularly its relevance and degree of personalization (Tam and Ho 2006); the use of animation, 
sound, or motion (Yoo and Kim 2005; Chen et al. 2009); as well as the banner’s size (Sigel, Braun, and Sena 2008; 
Burns and Lutz 2008), design (Lohtia, Donthu, and Hershberger 2003), location (Ryu et al. 2007), visual complexity 
(Huhmann 2003), and color scheme (Moore, Stammerjohan, and Coulter 2005). 
 
Empirical studies on the cost effectiveness of Web banner advertising can be further divided into two groups—
algorithmic and strategic. Noting that advertisers compete for the premium space on a publisher’s Web page, 
researchers in the former group have treated revenue maximization as an online variant of the well-studied bin-
packing problem (Dyckhoff 1990). Accordingly, they developed and tested a variety of scheduling algorithms to 
optimize advertisement inventory (Nakamura 2002), display frequency (Amiri and Menon 2003; Kumar, Jacob, and 
Sriskandarajah 2006), and budget allocation (Fruchter and Dou 2005). 
 
The “strategic” studies employ a broader frame of reference for the revenue maximization question. Namely, they 
consider competitive and cooperative relationships that exist among different participants in the online advertising 
industry (e.g., Sherman and Deighton 2001). And while their designs and results may differ, they do all agree on one 
point: the motivations and behaviors of several parties can influence the ad pricing decisions. For example, in their 
examination of the pricing of banner advertisements Li and Jhang-Li (2009) examine the roles of four key players in 
the online advertising industry—advertisers, visitors, publishers, and channel providers under two market 
conditions—duopoly, i.e., the presence of two heterogeneous channel providers (e.g., Google for search advertising 
and Double-Click for display) and monopoly, where the two channels “are merged into a single dominant player with 
monopolistic power in the market.” Kumar, Dawande, and Mookerjee (2007) include advertisers, publishers, and 
visitors in their model, while Fruchter and Dou (2005) include the role of advertisers, visitors, and two types of 
publisher—specialized and generic portals. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper makes three important contributions to IS research. To our knowledge it represents the first application of social network analysis 
(SNA) to research on Web-based advertising performance. SNA is a very robust method and is routinely used in fields as diverse as 
sociology, business administration, computer science, and the economics of technological innovation. This is also the first study to develop a 
pricing model for Web banner ads including variables other than the number of impressions received—a variable which is by far the most 
important and influential. Finally, this is one of a very small handful of studies anywhere in the IS fields that constructs a social network 
based on hyperlinks between competing sites (Weblogs) and then explains variation in their performance—i.e., advertising prices and 
revenues—based on position within that network. 
 
More specifically, the study provides evidence that advertising prices are function not only of (1) the number of impressions a Web site 
receives, but also on (2) the size of the ad, (3) its location on the page, (4) the number of competing ads, and most importantly the position 
that the Weblog occupies within a network formed by hyperlinks in a community of similar sites (political Weblogs). That position is known 
generally in the literature as “network constraint” and is measured here by the degree to which a particular website serves to bridge 
otherwise disconnected segments of a network. The findings here are somewhat counter-intuitive to the echo-chamber argument that has 
been advanced against political Weblogs, i.e., that they form insular communities disinterested in dissenting views. This study shows quite 
clearly that Weblogs that bridge otherwise disconnected segments of the political blogosphere—either within their political orientation or 
across it—command significantly higher prices for their advertising, all else being equal. 
 
This research is expected to be very interesting to researchers focusing on pricing and performance models of Web-based advertising. It 
may be moderately interesting to publishers of Weblogs seeking to justify higher prices for their ad space, as well as for their advertisers, 
especially those looking to optimize their advertising expenditures. Finally, the findings should also be of interest to owners of social 
networking sites that wish to determine which members have the most social capital—i.e., occupy the most influential positions within one or 
more social networks—rather than simply who has the most “friends” or “followers.” 
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Unfortunately, the supply of scholarly research on how to “crack the code of social network advertising” falls far 
below demand from industry professionals (Williamson 2008). Only within the last two to three years have published 
empirical studies begun to appear that explicitly examine advertising models for social networking sites (e.g., Enders 
et al. 2008) or that apply the concepts and methods of social network analysis to the study of interactive marketing 
and advertising (e.g., Okazaki, 2009). However, none of these studies directly address whether and how position 
and function in an online social network impacts measures of advertising effectiveness or influences the price of 
advertising therein. 
 
The absence of any such studies is especially striking given the extensive literature on brand communication and 
cost effectiveness of Internet advertising. In short, while the interactive aspects have been examined exhaustively, 
the networked nature of the phenomenon has attracted little or no formal attention from scholars. This paper 
addresses that gap in the literature. I do so by identifying the extent to which one widely employed measure of social 
network structure—network constraint (Burt 1995)—explains variation in prices for banner advertisements within an 
online social network. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an extensive literature review and the 
formulation of five hypotheses. In Section 3 I describe the data sample and research methods employed in this 
study, while in Section 4 I discuss the results of the data analysis. Section 5 contains a discussion of the implications 
of the results and suggestions for future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Simply stated, social network analysis involves defining the structure of relationships or ties among a set of actors. 
Those actors may include “individuals within groups, teams, and organizations, organizations and firms themselves, 
computers and Web sites, members of online communities, etc.” (Krebs 2009). Ties occur between pairs of actors or 
nodes in the network and the pattern of linkages among all pairs is what defines the social structure of the network. 
Network relationships are typically displayed in two ways. The first is in an adjacency matrix, as shown in Table 1 
below, where a “1” in a cell, e.g., row = “D” and column = “B,” signifies the existence of a link between the 
corresponding nodes, i.e., nodes “D” and “B.” The second method is as a sociograph constructed from the data in 
the corresponding adjacency matrix, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Generic Adjacency Matrix for Six Nodes, A Through F 
 A B C D E F 
A --        
B 1 --      
C 1 0 --    
D 1 1 1 --   
E 0 0 1 0 --  
F 1 0 0 0 0 -- 
 
Figure 1: Sociograph constructed from network data in Table 1. 
 
Social network analysis has been applied to a wide variety of academic fields and settings. Chief among them are 
the social sciences where it is frequently used in studies of individual, group/team and organizational performance 
(Burt 2005); the information sciences, most notably in studies of the interdisciplinarity of academic journals 
(Leydesdorff 2007); criminology, particularly the analysis of terrorist, gang, and extremist activity (Xu and Chen 
2005); and artificial intelligence, including the study of distributed expertise (Campbell et al. 2003) and computer-
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In each of these fields ties among actors and nodes have been defined differently. For example, in the first they are 
defined by both formal (reporting) and/or informal (social) relationships (Burt 2001). In the second case, it is citations 
to academic papers, while in the last, e-mail exchanges are used. Variation in definitions aside, what really 
distinguishes SNA from other approaches to the above questions is the emphasis it places on relationships rather 
than attributes of the actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994), and consequently on their interdependence rather than 
independence. As Borgatti and Li (2009) state, “[a] fundamental axiom in network analysis is the notion that actors 
are not independent but rather influence each other” and have important consequences for any number of key 
performance indicators. 
 
This does not mean that the social network approach dismisses attribute-related explanations—far from it. In truth, 
the arguments are analogous and in many ways complementary. For example, while human capital theories might 
resort to individual characteristics to explain differences in the performance of a group of managers or scientists—
some individuals are, after all, “more able … more intelligent, more attractive, more articulate, more skilled” (Burt 
2001, p. 32)—the social network argument treats social structure as “a kind of capital that can create for certain 
individuals and groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better connected people enjoy higher 
returns” (ibid., p. 32). 
 
Not surprisingly, debate has arisen concerning the definition of “better connected” and the mechanisms by which 
social structure confers advantage. Burt (2001) defines two distinct but related ways in which actors may be better 
connected. He terms them brokerage and closure. The “closure argument is that social capital is created by a 
network of strongly interconnected elements,” while the “structural hole argument is that social capital is created by a 
network in which people broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments” (ibid., p. 31). 
 
In both cases the management of information flows in the network is mechanism by which advantage is achieved. 
Brokers, i.e., those who bridge structural holes, are advantaged by their “position in the social structure” in three 
distinct ways. First, because they are in contact with numerous distinct and disconnected groups, brokers have 
access to a wider variety of, and thus less redundant, information. Second, brokers have earlier access to this less 
redundant, more diverse information. Being stationed at the intersection of the information flow between groups 
permits brokers to be among the first to learn about the activities and interests of the different groups. Finally, 
brokers have some influence on information diffusion between the groups that they bridge. They are “more likely to 
know when it would be rewarding to bring together separate groups” and thus have “disproportionate say in whose 
interests are served when the contacts come together” (Burt 2001, pp. 16–17). 
 
The closure argument also relies on information flows, but the mechanism is different. Just like peer groups and 
gossip networks, a dense pattern of connections means that the behavior of each node is observed by most 
members and reported on to all other members. Such a structure increases the odds of an actor “being caught and 
punished for displaying belief or behavior inconsistent with preferences” of other members. As such, social capital in 
closed networks accrues from its ability to decrease variation in a group behavior and to reinforce the status quo. 
But this should not be understood in a negative light. The cohesion, trust, and collaboration characteristics of closed 
networks are a precondition to realizing the value of brokerage: effective brokerage must occur between two or more 
groups whose members are well integrated and closely linked. Closure is, then, “a complement to brokerage such 
that the two together define social capital in a general way in terms of closure within a group and brokerage beyond 
the group” (Burt 2005, p. 7). 
 
Despite the complementary nature of brokerage and closure, their consequences for performance are not 
equivalent. Burt’s (2000) review of research on social networks and social capital in organizations concluded that 
“closed networks—more specifically, networks of densely interconnected contacts—are systematically associated 
with substandard performance. For individuals and groups, networks that span structural holes are associated with 
creativity and innovation, positive evaluations, early promotion, high compensation, and profits” (Burt 2001, p. 45). 
 
Several studies in the recent decade report a positive relationship between the spanning of structural holes and 
performance of individual managers (Rodan and Galunic 2004), groups and teams (Balkundi et al. 2007), firms 
(Moran 2005) and industries (Soda, Usai, and Zaheer 2004; Iyer, Lee, and Venkatraman 2006). The benefits of 
brokerage have also been found in nonmanagerial settings and with noneconomic measures of performance. Four 
recent studies in particular—two of citation patterns and two of online social networks—are especially relevant to this 
study. 
 
Oh, Choi, and Kim’s (2006) study of citation patterns in the management Information Systems field reports that 
“knowledge capital derived from a network rich in structural holes has a positive influence on an individual 
researcher’s academic performance” (ibid., p. 265). In their study of highly creative scientists in the field of nano-
technology, Heinze and Bauer (2007) find that “scientists who effectively broker otherwise disconnected colleagues 
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receive higher citation scores” (ibid., p. 827). Ganley and Lampe (2009) analyzed Slashdot, a technology-related 
news Web site which permits users to “declare relationships with other users” and which contains “Karma,” a peer 
reputation and ranking system. They found “the bridging of structural holes [to be] strongly related to the status of 
participants in the beginning and middle part of their Karma-building experience....” Finally, Okoli and Oh (2007) find 
brokerage among participants in an open-source community—Wikipedia’s open content encyclopedia community—
to be positively associated with “recognition-based performance,” i.e. “the formal status they are accorded in the 
community” (ibid., p. 240). 
 
While there is considerable evidence that brokerage is also associated with superior performance in information-
intensive and online settings, there has yet to be an examination of role of social structure in relation to any aspect 
of online advertising. Still, it is justified to hypothesize that 
H1: All else equal, Web sites that broker gaps in their social network will command significantly higher 
prices for the advertisements appearing on their pages. 
Four other variables have been shown by prior research to have an effect on the advertising prices, and/or on 
related measures of advertising performance such as click-through-rates and communication effectiveness—the 
number of impressions received by an advertisement, the size of the ad, its location, and the relative space 
dedicated to ads. 
 
Impressions 
Cost-per-impression (CPM) has long been the dominant method of pricing display advertising—both online and off 
(Hoffman and Novak 2000; Evans, 2008). A survey of fifty-one interactive agencies’ pricing, measurement, and pre-
testing practices reported that cost-per-thousand impressions (CPM) to be the most popular method of pricing 
banner ads (Shen 2002). Just over 90 percent of respondents stated that they “always or frequently” used CPM in 
pricing banner ads, significantly greater than the percentage stating that they always or frequently used click-through 
(33.4 percent), flat-fee (19.6 percent), unique visitor (13.8 percent), or cost per action/outcome (5.9 percent). 
H2: All else being equal, the price commanded will increase with the number of impressions the 
advertisement receives. 
Size 
In print media it is common practice to price banner or display advertisement according to size. Prior research has 
shown that advertisement prices increase nonlinearly with size (Busse and Rysman 2005). Larger print 
advertisements have also been shown to act as a positive indicator of advertising costs and effort, an indicator which 
they use to draw inferences about product quality (Homer 1995). In online advertising, advertising size has been 
shown to positively impact brand recall (Li and Bukovac 1999; Chatterjee 2008) and the intention to click on banner 
ads (Cho 1999), though not always on actual click-through rates (Robinson, Wysocka, and Hand 2007; Sigel, Braun, 
and Sena 2008). Thus, despite prior research specifically linking advertising size to price, it is reasonable, based on 
print and new media industry practice, to hypothesize that 
H3: All else being equal, the price commanded for banner ads will increase with the size of the advertisement. 
Location 
A banner advertisement’s location has been shown to influence brand recognition (Calisir and Karaali 2008) and 
recall (Razzouk and Seitz 2003), pre-attentive processing (Ryu et al. 2007), and the level of attention given to 
content and advertisement areas of a Web page (Wang and Day 2007; Dewan, Freimer, and Zhang 2002). The 
study of Dewan et al. (2002) recommended specifically that “Web advertising located in the earlier and later stages 
of a (browsing) path should be priced higher than advertising in the middle phases because during these two phases 
the audience is more sensitive to peripheral advertising” (p. 1404). 
H4: All else being equal, banner advertisements appearing in the upper regions of the Web page will 
command higher prices. 
Number of Ads 
The large majority of Web site provide content or information for free and, as in the radio and TV industries, they 
earn revenue by allowing advertising targeted at the site’s visitors. As noted by Hofacker and Murphy (2000), free-
content sites like Weblogs or news or information providers typically earn their ad revenue in one of two ways—(1) 
the advertiser pays per impression or (2) pays each time a visitor clicks on an ad and is taken to another Web site. 
In one of the first studies of clickable banner ads on content Web sites, these authors found that while click-through 
rates did not decrease when the number of banner ads on Web page increased from one to two, the ratio of 
advertising-to-content does result in customer disutility, lower advertisement revenues, and lower advertisement 
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H5: All else being equal, the price commanded for banner ads will decrease with the number of ads 
appearing on the page. 
DATA AND METHODS 
I tested the hypotheses presented in Section 2 with a data set collected from North Carolina-based Blogads.com™, 
a channel provider that serves banner advertisements to over 1500 popular Web sites and Weblogs. Founded in 
2002, Blogads.com describes itself as “a network of influential bloggers who collaborate to promote and sell blog 
advertising.” As the channel operator, Blogads.com takes only 30 percent of the advertising fee charged by the 
publishers after deducting credit card and other transaction costs. Banners come in three sizes of banner 
advertisements—“Hi-Rise,” “Standard,” and “Mini.” Their dimensions in pixels, file types and sizes, and character 
limits are provided in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2:Blogads.com™ Banner Advertisement Specifications 
Type Max Image 
Size (pixels) 
Max File Size, 
jpeg/gif (kB) 




Hi-Rise 150 x 600 35 70 300 
Standard 150 x 200 16 32 300 
Mini 150 x 100 5 10 100 
 
Prospective advertisers identify and select Weblogs from a directory sorted in two ways: (1) by the number of 
impressions or (2) by “hives,” i.e., groupings based on common interests, demographics, geography, etc. 
Importantly, it is the publishers of Weblogs, not the company, that create the “hives” and set the conditions for 
membership. Dozens of hives have been created along several demographic variables and interest groupings. 
Examples include gender and sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, politics, environment and sustainability, travel, 
guns, and economics. While Blogads believes that the hives have network effects—“allying with other quality 
bloggers increases your revenues”—only anecdotal evidence is offered to support this claim (Blogads 2011a). The 
first is a testimonial by a Los Angeles based blogger, Matt Welch: 
Network effects will work very well here. The more participating blogs from Los Angeles, the easier it is for 
advertisers to make a useful, targeted group buy (and therefore pay me more money!). This also works for 
subjects—media, baseball analysis, DIY music, whatever. 
The second piece of evidence is Blogads claim that “multi-blog orders drive 75% of revenues” (ibid.). This means 
that 75 percent of advertising revenues come from advertisements placed on several blogs at a time, presumably 
when they choose by hive and thus advertise on all blogs within the hive at once. 
 
In addition to prices, both directories contain several other pieces of information about each Weblog, information that 
can inform the advertiser’s decision making. Prices across and within hives can be compared according to an ad’s 
duration (one or two weeks, one month or three months), its location on the page (top, left, right, or premium), its 
size (see Table 3), its file type (static or animated), and the total number of Blogads.com banner ads appearing on 
the page. 
 
All data used in this study was collected between mid-November and early December of 2006 on Blogads’ two 
largest hives—the then eighty-nine-member “Liberal” hive and the then eighty-four-member “Conservative” hive. But 
political blogs were not chosen as the focus of this study just because they constituted the largest grouping within 
Blogads. Rather, they were chosen because their relative size reflected the rankings and notoriety that they had 
already gained within the broader blogosphere (Sifry 2005). In its first “State of the Blogosphere,” Technorati—the 
first Web site devoted to ranking Weblogs and maintaining a directory of them—made special note of the 
disproportionately positive contribution of political blogs to blogosphere’s overall “posting volume” (Sifry 2004). 
Specifically, the report noted that 
Many of the volume increases were due to political events. Large spikes occurred around the Iowa 
Caucuses (the Howard Dean scream), the time of the Nick Berg beheading, when both conservative and 
liberal bloggers posted prolifically on the new form of terrorist threat... (ibid.). 
 
By the summer of 2004, many A-list political bloggers—generally, those with the highest posting frequencies, the 
largest followings, and the greatest numbers of inbound links—received journalistic credentials from both major 
political parties to cover their nominating conventions (Adamic and Glance, 2005). Before the year’s end, political 
blogs rose prominently in rankings of “top blogs” (Technorati.com 2004), a trend which continued unabated (e.g., 
BlogPulse.com 2005; Technorati.com 2009). Around the same time, social scientists—particularly political 
scientists—and legal scholars began to undertake systematic and theoretically-grounded studies of Weblogs (e.g., 
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Drezner and Farrell 2004; Coleman 2005; Solum 2006; Volokh 2006). Despite all of the attention that bloggers were 
receiving from readers, scholars, politicians, pundits, and even each other, attention didn’t translate directly into into 
dollars. However, with hundreds of thousands or even millions of page views per week, it made sound economic 
sense for bloggers of all stripes to begin accepting advertising. By early 2005, if not sooner, advertising on top 
political blogs—and on many more nowhere near the top—was widespread if not ubiquitous. Blogads.com 
succeeded in becoming the channel provider for several top political blogs and in 2003 created “hives” within which 
bloggers with similar political affiliations were grouped. 
 
Much like the political parties with which they are aligned, the Liberal and Conservative hives are comprised of 
Weblogs representing any number of demographic groups, interests, and constituencies. This much is evident from 
the most cursory examination of the names populating each hive. The Liberal Blog Advertising Network (LBAN) is 
home to several blogs with ideological links to the Democratic Party, e.g., DemBloggers, Democratic Underground, 
The Democratic Daily, and Democrats.com. Regional Democratic activists in both “blue states” (Young Philly 
Politics, Blue Oregon, Blue Jersey, and Blue Mass) and “red” states (Blue NC, Left in the West, Burnt Orange 
Report) are represented, as are members of other traditionally Democratic constituencies, including gays and 
lesbians (Pam’s House Blend, Republic of T), African-Americans (Oliver Willis, Steve Gilliard), academics (Bitch 
Ph.D., Juan Cole), the entertainment industry (Hollywood Liberal), Latinos (Latino Pundit), feminists (Feministing), 
environmentalists (Chris-Floyd). Also represented were leading members of the “netroots” (Daily Kos, My DD), 
implacable opponents of then-President Bush (Smirking Chimp), his administration’s foreign policy (Agonist), the 
Republican Party more generally (Crooks and Liars) and its assumed advocate, Fox News (News Hounds, All Spin 
Zone). 
 
An equally wide and diverse collection of voices were found in the Conservative Advertising Network (CAN). Among 
them were libertarians (Questions and Observations); economists (Newmark’s Door) and advocates of the Austrian 
(Chicago Boyz) and Schumpeterian (Tech Central Station) schools of economics; opponents of the ACLU (Stop the 
ACLU) and abortion (Pro-Life Blogs); religious conservatives (Biblical Womanhood, Hugh Hewitt); unabashed 
supporters of then-President Bush (Blogs for Bush); conservative law professors (Althouse, Professor Bainbridge) 
and practicing attorneys (Patterico, Powerline); members of the armed forces (Soldier Life), supporters of the global 
war on terror (Mil Blogging, Black Five, Sgt. Hook, Blogs of War) and 2
nd
 Amendment rights (The Other Side of Kim); 
and detractors of film-maker Michael Moore (Moore Watch) and liberal media bias (News Busters) more generally. 
Also included are consistent advocates of right-wing politics and causes (Hot Air, Right Wing News, Right-Thinking, 
The Conservative Voice), strident anti-liberals (Barking-Moonbat, Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler), and supporters of the 
Republican Party (GOP Bloggers) both in red states (Bama Pachyderm, Florida Cracker, Southern Appeal) and blue 
states (New England Republican). 
 
The Weblogs within and across these two hives are related in several ways. First of all, they all share the same 
channel provider for their display advertising—Blogads.com. Second, they produce and provide very similar content, 
and several are found in the same rankings of top political blogs (Adamic and Glance 2005; Klein 2009). Third, there 
are many hyperlinks between sites, particularly in the blogroll—the list of blogs that is typically placed in the sidebar 
and that “serves as a list of recommendations by the blogger of other blogs” (Blogmeister.com 2009). Hyperlinks are 
the measure of choice in social network analyses of Weblogs in general (Recuero 2008) and political Weblogs in 
particular (Adamic and Glance 2005), because bloggers regularly read, comment on, and link to one another’s blogs 
(Furukawa et al. 2007). Finally, because of the above, it is presumed that these blogs share many of the same 
visitors or readers. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Weekly prices for banner ads appearing on all 173 Weblogs were obtained directly from the Blogads directory of 
hives. Because advertisements could take one of three sizes (Hi-rise, standard, and mini), could appear in the “top” 
and “premium” locations or not, could be located on the left or right side of the page, as many as twelve prices were 
obtained per Weblog. Publishers of Weblogs within the Blogads community make several crucial decisions 
concerning advertisements that appear on their blog. First, they set their own prices. They are not compelled to keep 
prices in line with other members of the hive. They are not even given suggested cost-per-impression guidelines. 
Second, they can accept or reject any advertisement from any advertiser contacting them via Blogads. Third, once 
they accept an advertisement they can choose the location of the advertisements, the number of ads that will appear 
in a location, the size of the ads, and the duration of their appearance. And finally, publishers can and do run ads 
from other channels at the same time, e.g., Google Adsense or Amazon Affiliates. 
 
Independent Variables 
Network constraint is a measure of social capital that reflects the degree to which a node acts as a bridge or broker 
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basis for calculating this measure of social structure. Data on each Weblog’s outbound links was obtained using 
Web Data Extractor™, a software program which crawled each page of a Weblog and extracted the base URL of 
every Web site to which it created a hyperlink. These links could appear in the body of a post, in the comments fields 
following a post, or in the blogroll. Table 3 below provides some descriptive statistics on the number and distribution 
of links within and between the two hives. 
 
Table 3: Number and Distribution of Links Between and  










Sum 1968 3299 782 645 
Mean 23.4 37.1 9.3 7.2 
Median 21.5 36.0 4.0 4.0 
Standard Dev. 19.9 18.9 11.7 8.5 
N = 0 8 0 22 18 
N = 1–5 11 4 26 30 
N = 6–10 13 4 9 21 
N = 11–20 9 10 11 10 
N = 21–30 11 18 9 7 
N = 31–40 14 16 5 3 
N > 40 18 37 2 0 
 
Several important differences in the number and pattern of links are noteworthy. The eighty-nine Liberal blogs made 
an average of 37.1 links to other Liberal Weblogs—about 68 percent more than the Conservatives-to-Conservative 
average of 23.4 (t = 4.63, p < 0.001, equal variance assumed). Liberal Weblogs made an average of 7.2 links to 
Conservative Weblogs compared to an average of 9.3 from Conservatives to Liberal blogs. That difference itself is 
significant when controlling for the number of within-hive links (t = –6.87, p < 0.001). 
 
Also notable are differences in the distribution of Weblogs linking within and across hives. About one-fourth of 
Conservative Weblogs (22 of 84) and one-fifty of Liberal ones (18 of 89) contain no links to blogs in the opposing 
hive. Another approximately one-fifty of Conservative blogs (26 of 83) and one-third of Liberal blogs (30 of 89) make 
between one to five links to blogs in the other hive. By contrast, over one-fourth of Conservative Weblogs (18 of 84) 
and over two-fifth of Liberal ones (37 of 89) have more than forty links to other members of their own hive. Finally, it 
is notable that not a single Liberal Weblog is without at least one link to another Liberal Weblog while eight 
Conservative Weblogs are not linked to other Conservatives. In short, Liberal blogs have more links in total, a higher 
proportion of links to other Liberal blogs, and greater number of blogs that are highly connected to each other. 
 
Six adjacency matrices were created using hyperlinks among the 173 Conservative and Liberal Weblogs. The first 
contained links between the eighty-four Conservative Weblogs, while the second contained only links between the 
eighty-nine Liberal Weblogs. The third matrix was formed from links between all 173 political Weblogs, i.e., 
hyperlinks from Conservatives to Conservatives, Conservative to Liberals, Liberal to Liberals, and Liberals to 
Conservatives. Both mutual and unilateral hyperlinks were included. That is to say, a tie exists between Blog A and 
Blog B if either one hyperlinked to the other or if both hyperlinked to each. A second version of each matrix was 
produced wherein only mutual links were retained, i.e., only where both Weblogs linked to each other. 
 
While the theoretical distinctions between brokerage and closure are clear, as a practical matter it is not possible to 
discern from a sociograph or adjacency matrix whether returns to closure or brokerage are superior. This can be 
determined only by matching measures of social structure with measures of performance and empirically testing the 
strength of the relationship. One measure of structure that has been developed to test competing social capital 
arguments is network constraint, “the extent to which a network is directly or indirectly concentrated in a single 
contact” (Burt 2001, p. 39). Network constraint on a node is high when it has few contacts, those contacts are 
densely connected, and/or the contacts are indirectly connected to the same central contact. The formula is given by 
Equation (1) for q not equal to i,j and where pij is the proportion of i’s relations that are invested in contact j. 
(1)  cij = (pij + Σq piq * pqj)
2
  
The total appearing in the parentheses is, then, the proportion of i’s relations that are invested in connection with 
contact j. Network constraint is given by Σjcij the sum of squared proportions. The direction of the relationship 
between performance and network constraint is crucial to determining which type of social capital prevails—
brokerage or closure. 
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More constrained networks span fewer structural holes which means less social capital according to the 
hole argument. If networks that span structural holes are the source of social capital, then performance 
should have a negative association with network constraint. More constraint means more network closure 
and so more social capital according to the closure argument. If network closure is the source of social 
capital, then performance should have a positive association with constraint (Burt 2001, p. 39). 
 
Version 6.1.5 of the social network analysis software program UCINet (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) was 
used to calculate network constraint from the six adjacency matrices. As shown in Table 4, below, four measures of 
constraint were then constructed, each of which varied according to the type of link that existed between nodes. 
 










C1 Mutual and 
Unilateral 
X X   
C2 Mutual Only X X   
C3 Mutual and 
Unilateral 
X X X X 
C4 Mutual Only X X X X 
 
Data for the four other independent variables—impressions, size, location, and number of ads per page were all 
obtained from the Blogads.com pages for “hive” or “mini-folder” (Blogads.com 2006/2011b). Tables 5a and 5b 
present descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all variables, respectively. Because I hypothesize that 
returns to brokerage are positive, then I expect that the relationship between constraint and performance—as 
measured by price—to be negative. Notably, all four measures of constraint are significantly and negatively 
correlated with advertisement price for the one week. 
 
Table 5a: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) Ln (Price) 767 4.49 1.55 2.30 9.55 
(2) Ln (Weekly Page Views) 767 10.69 1.71 6.82 15.7 
(3) Number of Ads  767 3.09 2.35 0 14 
(4) Ad = Hi-Rise# 767 0.33 0.47 0 1 
(5) Ad = Mini# 767 0.30 0.46 0 1 
(6) Location = Premium# 767 0.42 0.49 0 1 
(7) Hive = Liberal# 767 0.50 0.50 0 1 
(8) Constraint, C1 764 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.53 
(9) Constraint, C2 752 0.34 0.26 0.07 1.00 
(10) Constraint, C3 767 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.79 
(11) Constraint, C4 705 0.32 0.26 0.06 1.00 
# = categorical (dummy) variable 
 
Table 5b: Zero-Order Correlation Matrix 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Ln (Price) --          
(2) Ln (Weekly Page Views) 0.77a --         
(3) Number of Ads 0.00 0.13a --        
(4) Ad = Hi-Rise 0.40a 0.01 -0.01 --       
(5) Ad = Mini -0.36a -0.04 0.05 -0.46a --      
(6) Location = Premium 0.01 -0.09c -0.12b 0.02 -0.03 --     
(7) Hive = Liberal 0.28a 0.25a 0.26a -0.01 -0.01 -0.20a --    
(8) Constraint, C1 -0.42a -0.44a -0.10b -0.01 0.01 0.20a -0.37a --   
(9) Constraint, C2 -0.32a -0.35a -0.10b -0.01 0.01 0.16a -0.25a 0.72a --  
(10) Constraint, C3 -0.36a -0.38a -0.09c -0.02 0.00 0.15a -0.28a 0.77a 0.56a -- 
(11) Constraint, C4 -0.42a -0.42a -0.07c -0.01 0.03 0.12b -0.22a 0.76a 0.95a 0.77a 
a
 = p  0.001, 
b
 =  p < 0.01, 
c
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RESULTS 
Table 6, shown below, displays the results of the regression of the natural log of advertising price on five groups of 
independent variables—one for each hypothesis. Notably, in each of the four regression models, the relationship 
between each independent variable and advertising price is highly significant in the predicted direction (p < 0.001). 
Hypothesis 1 held that the less constraint there is on a given Weblog, the higher the price it commands for 
advertisements placed on its pages. The results displayed in Tables 6 indicate that this relationship holds when 
constraint is measured only from mutual links (Models 2 and 4) and when measured from both mutual and unilateral 
links (Models 1 and 3). Similarly, it holds for links between blogs with shared political orientations (Models 1 and 2) 
and with links that cross the partisan divide (Models 3 and 4). Interestingly, the relationship between constraint and 
prices is strongest in Model 4 where only mutual links between blogs of differing orientations are used—in other 
words, in the network formed by all 173 “Conservative” and “Liberal” Weblogs. This suggests that all else being 
equal, Weblogs that bridge holes across the partisan divide command the highest prices of all. 
 
Every one of the variables associated with Hypotheses 2–5 are also significant at the p < 0.001 level or better and in 
the expected direction. Specifically, price increases as the number of weekly page views goes up (H2), as the ad 
size expands (H3), and when its location is exclusive and/or highest on the right or left column (H4). Conversely, 
price decreases for smaller ads (H3) and as the number of ads increases (H5). A noteworthy and unexpected finding 
is that Weblogs belonging to the Liberal hive command significantly higher prices for advertisements than their 
Conservative counterparts (p < 0.001, t = 8.01). Finally, adjusted-R
2
 is over 80 percent for all four models and thus 
indicates that these six variables explain more variation than they leave unexplained. 
 
 
Table 6: OLS Regression of the Natural Log of Advertisement Price on Political Orientation,  
Four Measures of Network Constraint, the Natural Log of Weekly Page Views, Banner Size,  
Banner Location, and Number of Banners 
Variable Hypothesis Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Orientation = Liberal
#










Network Constraint: C1 H1  -1.346*** 
(-3.53) 
   
Network Constraint: C2 H1   -0.353*** 
(-3.47) 
  
Network Constraint: C3 H1    -1.172*** 
(-4.05) 
 
Network Constraint: C4 H1     -0.624*** 
(-5.81) 


























































Observations 767 764 752 767 705 
F-statistics 539.9 472.3 463.6 474.5 457.8 
Model degrees of freedom (df) 6 7 7 7 7 
R-squared 81.0% 81.4% 81.4% 81.4% 82.1% 
Adjusted R
2
 80.9% 81.2% 81.2% 81.2% 82.0% 
***= p <0.001, 
# = dummy variable 
Non-standardized coefficients 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Two sided t-tests. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Models 1–4 were also run on eleven sub-samples of the data: price above and below the median (1–2), weekly page 
views above and below the median (3–4), the number of advertisements greater than zero (5), standard-sized (6), 
high-rise (7), and mini advertisements (8), premium and top locations (9), only Liberal blogs (10), and only 
Conservative blogs (11). In the large majority of these conditions, at least one of the four measures of constraint was 
significant at the 0.001-level or better. Three of the conditions had one of the four measures significant at only the 
0.05-level: price above the median, mini ads only, and premium and top locations only. Finally, in no instance was a 
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measure of constraint found to be positive and significant. Thus, the negative relationship between constraint and 
advertising prices is very robust. 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
Simply stated, multicollinearity results when two or more variables in a multiple regression are so highly correlated 
that estimates of their individual regression coefficients are unreliable. Multiple regression analysis attempts to 
isolate the effects of each of the model’s independent variables. Thus, when a new independent variable is added 
that is highly correlated to existing variables, several problems can arise. These include “substantially higher 
standard errors, with correspondingly lower t statistics,” “unexpected changes in coefficient magnitudes or signs,” 
and “nonsignificant coefficients despite a high R
2
” (Hamilton 2008, p. 224). Despite the centrality of correlation, the 
presence of multicollinearity can’t “necessarily be detected, or ruled out, by examining a matrix of correlations 
among variables” (ibid., p. 225). One of the most common tests of the presence of multicollinearity is the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), a measure of the variance of the coefficient estimate that is being inflated by multicollinearity. 
Typically, VIF values of 5–10 or more are taken to indicate the presence of multicollinearity (Chatterjee, Hadi, and 
Price 2006, p. 238). Table 7, below, shows the VIF scores for the control and independent variables in regression 
models 1–4. The average VIF scores range from 1.18–1.23, well below the threshold that would indicate the 
presence of multicollinearity. In every model the VIF values for advertisement location and the number of ads are 
below average (1.05–1.09), while those for network constraint are above average (1.19–1.38). 
 
Table 7: Regression Diagnostics: Multicollinearity Tests and Effect Size Estimation 
Multicollinearity: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Effective Size: Partial eta-squared (ηp
2
) 
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Political Orientation 1.26 1.19 1.21 1.19 5.5% 6.2% 6.4% 7.1% 
Network Constraint, C1 1.38 X X X 1.6% X X X 
Network Constraint, C2 X 1.19 X X X 1.6% X X 
Network Constraint, C3 X X 1.24 X X X 2.1% X 
Network Constraint, C4 X X X 1.24 X X X 4.6% 
Weekly Page Views 1.27 1.18 1.21 1.29 69.2% 71.1% 70.1% 68.4% 
Size = High Rise 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 28.8% 28.5% 28.6% 28.9% 
Size = Mini 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.28 12.4% 12.2% 12.5% 13.1% 
Location 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05 4.1% 4.1% 3.7% 4.4% 
Number of Ads 1.06 1.09 1.09 1.09 5.9% 5.9% 6.5% 2.9% 
 
Effect Size Estimation 
Effect sizes are measures of the magnitude of the effect of a treatment. They provide information on the substantive 
effect of variable that is not possible to infer from statistical significance alone. While most commonly used in meta-
analyses, the measure is applicable to multivariate regression analysis within a single study as well. The measure 
most appropriate to this study is partial eta-squared (Bakeman and Robinson 2005) which is “the ratio of the sum of 
squares for the effect of interest to the sum of squares for that effect plus the sum of squares error” (McCoach and 
Seigle 2009, p. 209). In simpler terms, it is a measure of the proportion of the total variance that is attributable to a 
treatment or effect. Cohen (1988, p. 283) provides the following scale for interpreting eta-squared effect sizes: above 
0.99 percent is a “small” effect; above 5.88 percent is a “medium” effect; and above 13.79 percent is a “large” effect. 
Table 7, above, also shows the effect sizes for the control and independent variables of the four models described in 
Table 6. The effect sizes cover the range from small to large. Notably, the effect size of weekly page views is the 
largest in every model (68.4–71.1 percent), while that for network constraint is the smallest in three of four models 
(1.6–4.6 percent). The second largest effect sizes are associated with the advertisements location. Specifically, the 
effect size for “high-rise” advertisements averages 28.7 percent, while that for “mini” ads averages nearly 12.5 
percent. With the effect sizes for location, the number of ads, and political orientation averaging 4–6 percent, 
network constraint clearly has the weakest of all effect sizes. Only in one of the four models is it not the weakest—
the model where only mutual links within and across political orientation were used. Finally, it should be recalled that 
because “nonerror variation” can be accounted for by other variables in the model, partial eta-squared values are not 
“measures of unique variation in the dependent variable” (Pierce, Block, and Aquinas 2004, p. 919). And because 
they are calculated using different values of the total explainable variation, partial eta-squared values can and 
usually do add up to greater than 100 percent. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study have several important implications for research on the effectiveness of online advertising. 
The key finding is that there was found a statistically significant relationship between social capital—measured as 
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political Weblogs that linked otherwise disconnected segments of the political blogosphere—either within or across 
political orientations—commanded higher prices for their advertisements, all else being equal. This broadly confirms 
the “strategic” approach to banner advertising pricing which incorporates into its models the actions and motivations 
of industry participants, principally advertisers, channel providers, and publishers. What is new in this study is both 
the relationship among publishers—interconnected and interdependent—and the relationship with their common 
channel provider—partners rather than price takers. That said, it must be noted that the effect size of this finding is 
small, though not trivial. For the first study of its kind, this is not a reason for undue concern. Future research should 
more closely investigate whether significant interactions exist between network and content-related characteristics of 
political Weblogs, as well as nonpolitical blogs. 
 
A second contribution of this study is its confirmation of long-standing findings of the broader literature on cost 
effectiveness and on communication effectiveness in online advertising. As we recall, several variables in the pricing 
model were shown to significantly impact the price of online advertising. Regarding the former, the number of 
impressions an ad receives—a variable which previous studies have shown to have a positive influence on price—
was here shown to do likewise. Moreover it was the strongest of all variables in the model, having an adjusted-R
2
 of 
almost 60 percent. This strongly confirms research identifying cost-per-impression as the dominant pricing model. 
Other variables in the model having the predicted effect was the number of ads appearing on the page: prior 
research has shown it to have a negative impact on advertising prices. Two other variables in this study—
advertisement size and location—have shown positive effects on both communication outcomes like brand recall 
and recognition and on behavioral measures like click-through. Here both were shown to have positive and 
significant effects on advertisement prices, as well. 
 
Political affiliation of the blogger, as expressed by hive membership, is the final variable in this study that has been 
shown to affect online advertising prices. Specifically, Liberal bloggers commanded significantly higher advertising 
prices, all else being equal. I am aware of no studies that assessed the impact of political orientation on any 
measure of advertising effectiveness. That said, a wide variety of demographic variables and consumer attitudes 
have also been shown to influence online buying behavior, attitude toward online advertisements, and other 
measures of advertising effectiveness (Schlosser, Shavitt, Kanfer 1999; Carr and Brackett 2001; Liu and Shrum 
2002). 
 
Moreover, several recent studies have identified personality and psychological antecedents that influence how 
actors in social networks structure their interactions with others. Specifically, brokers tend to be high self-monitors 
(Oh and Kilduff 2008) and have more “entrepreneurial personalities” insofar as they eschew conformity, security, 
and stability in favor of advocacy, change, and positions of authority (Burt, Jannotta, and Mahoney 1998, p. 63). 
Kalish and Robins (2006) report that people who bridge structural holes are relatively more individualistic, are more 
extraverted, and are more likely to believe they control events in their lives. Finally, Lewis et al. (2008) have made 
publicly available a new data set which they gathered from Facebook.com. They report that “subgroups defined by 
gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are characterized by distinct network behaviors, and students 
sharing social relationships as well as demographic traits tend to share a significant number of cultural preferences” 
(p. 330). 
 
Those findings, along with this study, have important implications for advertising effectiveness in environments 
characterized by computer-mediated communication and relationship formation, not the least of which are online 
social networks and social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter. For example, Facebook launched its “Project 
Beacon” in November 2007 (Facebook.com 2007) as a “core element of the Facebook Ads system for connecting 
businesses with users and targeting advertising to the audiences they want.” In short, the system allows users to 
share information about actions taken on participating sites. In practice, this means that 
Fandango, the nation’s leading moviegoer destination, is using Beacon so when Facebook users purchase a 
movie ticket on Fandango.com, they can share their movie plans with their friends on Facebook. Consumers 
gain a new way to tell their friends about their movie tastes, while Fandango is able to gain greater social 
distribution on Facebook (ibid.). 
Despite pushback from privacy rights advocates, the Facebook’s efforts continue apace, the most recent example 
being its “instant personalization” feature which allows user profile data to be shared with participating third-party 
Web sites (Boulton 2010). Specifically, when a Facebook user is logged in and then visits one of the participating 
Web sites, they will view an “instantly personalized” page, one that takes their “public Facebook information,” e.g. 
“name, profile picture, gender, and connections” into account (ibid.). 
 
But companies participating in “Project Beacon” and “instant personalization” stand to gain much more than “social 
distribution” or reap the benefits from viral marketing and e-word-of-mouth. In short, there is the possibility of 
constructing and analyzing social networks from a variety of behavioral and relationship data, computing several 
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measures of social structure, matching it with demographic and personality-level data and using it all to explain 
variation in advertising pricing, click through, cost-per-action, or even communication effectiveness. For example, 
advertisers could place ads on the pages of those deemed to be brokers and test for differences in any variety of 
performance and outcome measures. 
 
The same applies to Twitter, the social networking and micro-blog service which recently claimed to be uninterested 
in “traditional Web banner advertising,” yet not “philosophically opposed to any and all advertising” (Twitter.com 
2009). Unlike Facebook, where social structure is among people who have agreed to become online friends, 
members of Twitter are nominally part of two networks—those who follow their updates and those whose updates 
they follow. From the perspective of the focal member, were these two groups of members identical, there would be 
a perfectly-closed and highly-constrained network. However, to the degree that overlap between the followed and 
the followers is small, then the focal member is a bridge between two otherwise disconnected groups. Anecdotally it 
has been observed that membership in the two groups is unequal. Interestingly, a Web site has been established 
that allows people to calculate the ratio of friends and followers (Tffratio.com 2009) and that provides guidance on 
how to improve the ratio, i.e., get more followers. Twitter’s apparent predisposition toward brokerage may have 
factored into their deliberations about an advertising model for the service (Twitter 2009): 
The idea of taking money to run traditional banner ads on Twitter.com has always been low on our list of 
interesting ways to generate revenue. However, facilitating connections between businesses and 
individuals in meaningful and relevant ways is compelling. We're going to leave the door open for 
exploration in this area. Do we hate advertising? Of course not. It’s a huge industry filled with creativity and 
inspiration. There’s also room for new innovation in advertising, marketing, and public relations and Twitter 
is already part of that. 
 
One notable “new innovation” for facilitating such connections is the development of open-source and site-specific 
tools for displaying and analyzing personal networks. For example, just recently LinkedIn™, the business-oriented 
social networking site, has made available an application called InMaps, a color-coded and “interactive visual 
representation” of the social network formed by a user’s LinkedIn contacts (Imam 2011). According to the company, 
the application provides LinkedIn users with a better way to “understand the relationships (among their) entire set of 
LinkedIn connections” and to “better leverage (that) professional network to help pass along job opportunities, seek 
professional advice, (and) gather insights” (ibid.). Dozens of other software and Web-based applications exist that 
provide the same functionality as InMaps, all of which are means to the aforementioned ends. The practical 
implications of these developments for publishers and advertisers are worth stating directly. 
 
Whatever the advertising model that Twitter eventually settles upon or Facebook evolves toward, this much is 
evident: links between friends, between like-minded and topically-related Weblogs, and between followers and 
followed—all exhibit quantifiable social structures. But quantifiable is not the same thing as observable. As real-
world and online networks grow, tools for displaying, and studying them stands to become increasingly important for 
all concerned. At present, characteristics of the nodes in these networks are more easily observed than is the 
structure of the ties that link them. In this study, for example, page views are more easily tracked and taken into 
account in ad pricing decisions than are network measures such as constraint. By “easy” I mean less computational 
and human information processing is required to make such decisions. However, as applications become more 
powerful and as the need for advertisers and publishers to target visitors increases, network-based measures of 
influence will gain greater importance. At best, examining the characteristics of the nodes of a network allows 
advertisers and publishers to infer who are the brokers, i.e., who are the least constrained members. In order for this 
information to be quantified with precision, the use of network analytical tools and methods is an absolute 
requirement. That said, much more research is required to determine which network measures and which Weblog 
characteristics taken together best predict advertising prices. 
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